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From Hot Hands to Declining Effects
The Risks of Small Numbers
Michael S. Lauer, MD
Bethesda, Maryland
About 25 years ago, a group of researchers demonstrated that there is no such thing as the “hot hand” in pro-
fessional basketball. When a player hits 5 or 7 shots in a row (or misses 10 in a row), what’s at work is random
variation, nothing more. However, random causes do not stop players, coaches, fans, and media from talking
about and acting on “hot hands,” telling stories and making choices that ultimately are based on randomness.
The same phenomenon is true in medicine. Some clinical trials with small numbers of events yielded positive
findings, which in turn led clinicians, academics, and government officials to talk, telling stories and sometimes
making choices that were later shown to be based on randomness. I provide some cardiovascular examples,
such as the use of angiotensin receptor blockers for chronic heart failure, nesiritide for acute heart failure, and
cytochrome P-450 (CYP) 2C19 genotyping for the acute coronary syndromes. I also review the more general
“decline effect,” by which drugs appear to yield a lower effect size over time. The decline effect is due at least in
part to over interpretation of small studies, which are more likely to be noticed because of publication bias. As
funders of research, we at the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute seek to support projects that will yield
robust, credible evidence that will affect practice and policy in the right way. We must be alert to the risks of
small numbers. (J Am Coll Cardiol 2012;60:72–4) © 2012 by the American College of Cardiology Foundation
Published by Elsevier Inc. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jacc.2012.02.048(
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bJust over 25 years ago, the cognitive psychologist Amos
Gilovich et al. (1) published a provocative analysis of the
“hot hand” in professional basketball. After analyses of
thousands of shots, it turns out that, contrary to popular
belief, there is no such thing as a hot hand. Instead
people—players, coaches, fans, and the media—observe vari-
ations that are entirely due to random chance and read into
them actionable stories. These variations are invariably based
on small numbers of events (e.g., 5 consecutive baskets). The
study by Tversky et al. was not well received. The legendary
Boston Celtics coach Arnold “Red” Auerbach commented,
“Who is this guy? So he makes a study. I couldn’t care less” (2).
Although mistaking randomness for cohesive stories may
eem innocent enough when talking about professional
asketball, Tversky’s analysis revealed a truth about human
sychology that has far-reaching implications. People are
esistant to ascribe unexpected observations to random chance
nd much prefer to tell stories, stories that, in the words of
sychologist and Nobel Prize winner Daniel Kahneman, de-
cribe “a view of the world around us that is simpler and more
oherent than the data justify. Jumping to conclusions is a safer
port in the world of our imagination than it is in reality” (2).
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2012, accepted February 21, 2012.Fast forward from 1985’s classic paper by Gilovich et al.
1) to the year 2011 drawing to a close: Holmes et al. (3)
ublished a paper on the purported associations between
YP2C19 genotype and cardiovascular events among pa-
ients receiving the platelet antagonist clopidogrel. There
as been concern that patients with certain CYP2C19
ariants may be less likely to manifest decreased platelet
ctivity with clopidogrel and may therefore be at increased
isk for poor clinical outcomes. Despite a great deal of
ontroversy, the Food and Drug Administration issued a
black box warning,” and some companies are selling direct-
o-consumer genetic tests. Holmes et al. (3) reviewed 32
tudies involving 42,016 patients and 3,545 cardiovascular
vents and found no association between genotype and risk.
ut perhaps of even greater interest, the researchers found
hat the association was noted only in small studies—studies
ith relatively few events. There was a strong gradient
hereby the association weakened as the number of events
er study increased. CYP2C19 genotype predicted a sub-
tantially increased risk of events in studies with 99 or fewer
vents (pooled risk ratio [RR]: 1.83), a modestly increased
isk in studies with 100 to 199 events (pooled RR: 1.26),
nd no association in studies with at least 200 events (pooled
R: 0.97) (3). An important likely contributor to this
henomenon is “publication bias,” whereby small studies
howing an effect are more likely to be published than are
mall studies not showing an effect. In any case, just like
asketball’s hot hand, the phenomenon disappeared when
nvestigators analyzed large samples.
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legend Lawrence “Yogi” Berra’s words, “dé jà vu all over
again.” In 1997, Pitt et al. (4) published the primary results
of the ELITE (Evaluation of Losartan in the Elderly) study,
in which 722 patients with heart failure were randomly
assigned to captopril or losartan. The investigators powered
the trial to test an effect on renal function, but noted an
“unexpected” lower mortality rate (17 vs. 32 deaths in the
losartan and captopril groups, respectively; RR: 0.54). For-
tunately, the investigators argued that “whether the appar-
ent mortality advantage . . . holds true . . . requires further
study” (4). They proceeded to design and perform a second
trial (ELITE II), which enrolled 3,152 patients and re-
corded 530 deaths, 10 times the number of deaths in the
original ELITE trial. This time there was no effect of
losartan on mortality (280 vs. 250 deaths for captopril; RR:
1.13) (5).
And this past year we have seen at least 1 other prominent
example of a large study laying to rest beliefs generated by
multiple smaller studies. In 2002, a trial in 489 patients
suggested that nesiritide could lead to more rapid resolution
of decompensated heart failure (6). In 2005, however,
Sackner-Bernstein et al. (7) published an 862-patient meta-
analysis that found an increased risk of death within 30 days
of therapy; the analysis hinged on 50 deaths. This past year
saw the publication of a much larger trial of 7,141 patients,
among whom 267 died (8). In this trial, nesiritide did cause
hypotension (as noted in prior trials), but had minimal to no
impact on resolution of decompensated heart failure or
30-day mortality. In the nesiritide case, a large study refuted
beliefs of benefit and concerns about harm.
The “disappearance” of seemingly real effects, as was seen
with CYP2C19-clopidogrel and losartan in heart failure, is
becoming increasingly familiar to scientists and observers of
science. Journalist Jonah Lehrer (9) published an article in
The New Yorker on the so-called “decline effect,” with the
intriguing headline question, “Is there something wrong
with the scientific method?” Lehrer cited a number of
examples of effects or associations that disappeared upon
further, more rigorous investigations on drugs for the
treatment of psychosis, feather symmetry’s impact on the
behavior of swallows, and a range of topics in ecological and
evolutionary biology (10). And, indeed, no less a luminary
than the late paleontologist and evolutionary biologist
Stephen Jay Gould fell into the trap of small numbers when
he attempted to synthesize reasons why latter-day baseball
players have failed to bat over .400; his whole analysis was
based on only 9 “endpoints” of .400 or better season batting
averages throughout the history of baseball (11).
For students of probability, none of this should be
surprising. In a widely acclaimed paper, Ioannidis (12)
offered a mathematical proof showing that small, under-
powered studies are not only less likely to discover real
effects but are also more likely to yield false positive findings.
That is, if an underpowered study shows an effect, one that
meets standards for statistical significance, there is a highlikelihood that the study findings were the result of random
variation, variation that misleads us to think that an effect is
real. Because of publication and confirmation biases, small
positive studies are more likely to be published, discussed,
and ultimately believed (13–15). Once beliefs become en-
trenched, it becomes difficult to perform definitive large-
scale studies, or believe them if their results are negative.
What is the role of small studies? We often perform small
trials to see if there is a “biological signal,” a surrogate
endpoint that would suggest clinical benefit. If enough small
trials are positive, we might then proceed to a large
definitive trial. A problem arises, though, when a body of
evidence based on small trials becomes the basis for firm
beliefs that translate into practice. Califf (16) cited the
stories of antiarrhythmic drugs and hormone therapy as
cases in which much money was spent on many small trials,
trials with misleading results that led to real harm that only
stopped once large-scale trials were completed and reported.
Califf argues that excessive complexity and bureaucratic
requirements prevent investigators from moving rapidly to
large-scale pragmatic trials that are more likely to provide
clinically meaningful answers (16).
Perhaps we should decrease our reliance on small studies
and instead move more quickly to large-scale studies. The
only way we could contemplate this would be to ensure that
the large trials are simple, inexpensive, and, of course, large
enough to yield believable results (17). We know from
experience that it is possible to perform high-impact large
cardiovascular trials at very low cost (18). One of our top
priorities during this period of fiscal austerity is to discover
and “rediscover” our ability to design and execute large,
simple, and inexpensive trials. The National Heart, Lung,
and Blood Institute is now considering proposals for the
testing of novel methods that enable low-cost conduct of
clinical trials (19). We are particularly interested in ap-
proaches that minimize specialized infrastructure, minimize
clinic visits designed solely for collecting trial data, offer
novel low-burden methods of obtaining informed consent,
and employ low-cost methods of monitoring study conduct.
Scientific thought leaders have suggested other approaches,
including cluster randomization (20), point-of-care ran-
domization (21), better use of the Internet (22), passive
follow-up, incorporation of trials into existing clinical reg-
istries (23), and foregoing adjudication (24).
As funders of clinical studies and trials, the primary
interest of the National Heart, Lung, and Blood Institute is
to generate robust scientific evidence that is most likely to
have an impact on practice and policy in the right ways. As
Kahneman (2) and Gilovich et al. (1) pointed out, irrespec-
tive of training, humans are poor intuitive statisticians. We
should recognize the risks when over interpreting findings
generated from small, underpowered studies (2,12). We
should seriously consider employing alternate approaches
like Bayesian methods to construct measured, statistically
appropriate hypotheses on the basis of small studies,
whether they be basketball shooting streaks (25) or early
t
s
i
t
m
h
h
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
2
2
2
2
2
2
2
74 Lauer JACC Vol. 60, No. 1, 2012
Small Numbers July 3, 2012:72–4phase clinical trials. Bayesian methods may also help us
avoid over-interpretation of small, frequentist p values that
often accompany large studies (26). Furthermore, a Bayes-
ian perspective may help us make better decisions about how
to spend scarce research dollars. One could argue, for
example, that from a Bayesian perspective, the “out-of-
context” endpoint findings from the ELITE (Evaluation of
Losartan in the Elderly) study (4) were so unlikely to
represent a true effect that the ELITE II study (5) should
never have been performed. We should all keep in mind the
real opportunity costs borne by researchers and research
sponsors when going on “wild goose chases” resulting from
spurious leads from underpowered studies.
Our many experiences of the “decline effect” (9), whereby
he therapeutic effect of drugs appears to wane over time,
hould remind us of our obligation to better strategize when
t is most appropriate to conduct small studies and how best
o interpret their results. The implications go well beyond
isrepresenting hot hands in basketball—they go to the
eart of the power of the scientific method to improve
uman health.
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